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Abstract
The use of algorithmic prediction in insurance is regarded as the beginning of a new era, because it promises to
personalise insurance policies and premiums on the basis of individual behaviour and level of risk. The core idea is
that the price of the policy would no longer refer to the calculated uncertainty of a pool of policyholders, with the
consequence that everyone would have to pay only for her real exposure to risk. For insurance, however, uncertainty is
not only a problem – shared uncertainty is a resource. The availability of individual risk information could undermine the
principle of risk-pooling and risk-spreading on which insurance is based. The article examines this disruptive change first
by exploring the possible consequences of the use of predictive algorithms to set insurance premiums. Will it endanger
the principle of mutualisation of risks, producing new forms of discrimination and exclusion from coverage? In a second
step, we analyse how the relationship between the insurer and the policyholder changes when the customer knows that
the company has voluminous, and continuously updated, data about her real behaviour.
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Introduction: Social management
of shared uncertainty
In the last 10 years, the field of insurance has been
confronted with signs of a change that has been
announced as ‘disruptive’, whose outcomes are still
rather uncertain and largely unexplored. Recent tech-
niques of algorithmic prediction are raising high
expectations in insurance, but also putting under pres-
sure its probabilistic model of risk calculation and dis-
tribution. As a consequence of procedures using
machine learning and Big Data, new forms of predic-
tion are spreading in different areas of our society.
Approaches like Predictive Analytics claim to use
machine learning to give precise indications about the
future of a single event or individual, overcoming the
limitations of current statistical techniques that only
address averages and general trends (Mackenzie,
2015, 2016; Siegel, 2016).1 This possibility can have
deep consequences for the way to deal with uncertainty
in all fields, but for insurance it might mean a radical
change in its model, its function, and its social
meaning.
The claim to produce individualised prediction is
both exciting and frightening. It may lead to optimisa-
tion of the use of resources, to targeted prevention, and
to effective planning, but also to bind the future with
preemptive policies, that reproduce bias and reinforce
discrimination (Anderson, 2010; Angwin et al., 2016;
Amoore, 2013; De Goede and Randalls, 2009;
Kleinberg et al., 2017; Koepke, 2016; Lum and Isaac,
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2016; O’Neil, 2016). In any case, it breaks with the
current management of uncertainty based on modern-
ity’s idea of an open future, which underlies important
institutions in different domains of social life (Beckert,
2016; Esposito, 2007; Koselleck, 1979).
Influential historical studies analysed how in modern
Europe, starting from the 17th century, the rise of prob-
abilities calculus reshaped the relationshipwith the future
(Daston, 1980, 1987, 1988; Hacking, 1975, 1990; Porter,
1986). Relying on great numbers, sampling and general-
isation, probability calculus made it possible to cope with
the impossibility of knowing the future. Desrosieres
(1993), for example, showed that statistics-driven think-
ing became the foundation of modern institutions in
many fields, giving rise also to the development of a
social security and insurance system which is the object
of our analysis in the following pages.
As Daston (1988: 162ff) argues, insurance became a
reasonable and socially acceptable practice when it
based its operations on the mathematical calculation
of probability.2 Starting from the uncertainty of indi-
vidual cases, the laws of statistics showed that in the
mass and over the long run, an order could be found in
large numbers, and this made it possible to separate the
rational and foresighted attitude of insurance from the
temerity and unreasonableness of gamers. Insurance, in
fact, identifies collective regularities that justify a mutu-
alisation of risks, and spreads these risks making the
damage financially acceptable to everyone. Even if the
future remains uncertain, individuals and companies
can take risks and plan their activities in a controlled
and protected way.
Since the 19th century, insurance has played a crucial
role in enhancing social solidarity and managing risk in
the current ‘societes assurancielles’ (Ewald, 1986). The
insurance system relies on limited knowledge (nobody
can know the future in advance) and on a chronic con-
dition of information asymmetry (the customers do not
reveal to the insurer all information they possess). Risk-
pooling, which uses the laws of probability to spread the
cost of accidents over a large number of persons in
homogeneous groups, is still the foundation of insurance
practices (Corlosquet-Habart and Janssen, 2018). By
putting together many cases, the costs of future claims
are spread among all policyholders. The latter have an
interest in joining the pool, because the future is uncer-
tain and nobody can know in advance who will be
affected by misfortune (that is, who will report what
claim and when). Insurance offers a form of financial
compensation to policyholders, inasmuch as it can bal-
ance the losses of the more unfortunate cases with the
earnings of the luckier cases, and hope that in the end
the difference will be to its advantage.
Recently, however, algorithmic techniques claim to
offer individualised risk forecasts, which contrast with
the probabilistic forms of calculation of risk over a
more or less extended population. The problem, as
The Economist (2015) expresses it, is that usage-based
insurance (UBI) could ‘call into question the basic logic
of the insurance industry – that it is impossible to pre-
dict who will be hit by what misfortune when, and that
people should therefore pool their risks.’ A lively
debate is dealing with consequences and challenges of
algorithmic procedures for insurance industry and for
the function of insurance in society as a whole (cf.
Albrecht, 2017a, 2017b; Corlosquet-Habart and
Janssen, 2018; Ewald, 2012; Lasry, 2015; McFall,
2019; McFall and Moor, 2018; Meyers and Van
Hoyweghen, 2017; Siegelman, 2014; Thourot and
Folly, 2016). The aim of this article is to participate
in the debate by locating these phenomena in a broader
social and theoretical frame, as a background for
focused empirical research.
Besides analysing the actuarial literature and the
research on the transformation of insurance (both
from historical and sociological perspective), to devel-
op our argument we studied the internal reports of
insurance companies (Batty et al., 2010; Braun and
Schreiber, 2017; Ewald, 2012; Italian AXA Paper,
2016; Keller et al., 2018); we interviewed managers of
major insurance companies (e.g. the Internet of Things
Practice Leader for Swiss Re and the founder of IoT
Insurance Observatory); we analysed the current
experiments in the offer of policies in Europe and the
US (Vitality Drive, Fairzekering, Insurethebox,
Snapshot); we followed the debate on prospected inno-
vations in the field of insurance and the current studies
on the interplay of Big Data and insurantial practice
(Franc¸ois and Barry, 2018); we explored the technolog-
ical developments in algorithmic prediction and their
actuarial applications.
The article proceeds as follows. We open with a dis-
cussion of the possible disruptive effects of digital tech-
niques for the model of insurance. In the next step, we
explore the consequences of the use of predictive algo-
rithms to set insurance premiums. Will it endanger the
principle of mutualisation of risks, producing new
forms of discrimination and exclusion from coverage?
Referring to behavioural rates in car insurance, we then
analyse how the relationship between the insurer and
the policyholder could change if the latter knew that
the former has voluminous, continuously updated, data
about her real behaviour. Our main concern is that,
whereas the function of insurance was that of a libera-
tor of action encouraging enterprise and initiative,
algorithmic prediction risks turning insurance into an
inhibitor of action that discourages policyholders from
embarking on actions.
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A ‘disruptive’ change in the practice
of insurance
The driver of the expected disruptive changes in insur-
ance is digital technology, together with increased
availability of data. Technical devices designed for
other purposes,3 such as black boxes for vehicles or
smart watches for sports activities, can be used to col-
lect data about policyholders’ behaviour and to make
individualised predictions, leading to adjustments in
insurance rates for policyholders. The key formulas in
this regard are InsurTech (the use of technology inno-
vations in the field of insurance), UBI and Insurance of
Things (IoT;4 Boobier, 2016; Braun and Schreiber,
2017; Carbone and Silvello, 2018).
Insurance companies have an ambiguous attitude
towards this particular use of digital technology. On
the one hand, they perceive it as a great opportunity.
They see InsurTech, for example, as a possibility for
offering the customer a personalised policy, tailored to
her lifestyle and proportional to her individual level of
risk. The huge amounts of data that are produced
incessantly by digital technologies should help compa-
nies build a ‘profile’ of their policyholders and develop
specific offers for each individual case (Boobier, 2016;
Keller et al., 2018; Marr, 2015).5 According to Franc¸ois
Ewald (1986), who studied the social consequences of
modern insurance as a welfare institution, the combi-
nation of digital technologies and Big Data processing
marks the beginning of a ‘new era’ in the history of
insurance (Ewald, 2012: 15). Indeed, a number of
scholars feel that the insurance sector is discovering a
‘new world’ (Ewald, 2012: 72; see also Corlosquet-
Habart and Janssen, 2018; Ewald and Thourot, 2013;
Ralph, 2017; Thourot and Folly, 2016: 65ff) that could
radically change how companies design and sell insur-
ance coverage.
On the other hand, these new opportunities also
have the potential to become a threat, because they
may question the principle of risk-pooling and risk-
spreading on which the model of insurance is tradition-
ally based.6 Algorithmic techniques promise to offer
each customer an individualised prediction of her risk
profile and, with it, the possibility to pay the ‘right
price’ that corresponds to her characteristics, condi-
tions and behaviour, without having to pay for the
other members of the group in which the statistical
calculation placed her. This would endanger the very
principle of risk-pooling underlying the modern insu-
rance model. For the practice of insurance, the shared
uncertainty that derives from the fact that nobody
knows the future in advance is actually not only a
problem (one that calculation can never remove, but
only tame), but also the resource that makes it possible
to develop a mutualistic way to deal with uncertainty.
Individualised prediction threatens the entire insurance
model. Insurance is, in fact, a ‘business of uncertainties’
(Ericson and Doyle, 2004: 148). The issue at stake here
is not simply that insurance is a risky business: it is,
more radically, one of how to make profit by dealing
with uncertainty.7 The complicated calculations that
are made for the purpose of making allowance for
uncertainty obviously do not change future uncertainty
into certainty. Instead, they provide insurance compa-
nies with a sort of ‘substitute for certainty’8 that can be
bought and sold.
In this phase of exploration and experimentation,
any projection about the impact of algorithmic techni-
ques on insurance is highly speculative. Scenarios built
on the basis of technological possibilities risk not
taking adequately into account the social consequences
of the hypothesised innovations and sometimes not
even the repercussions on the business model of insur-
ance. This article is aimed as a provocation to highlight
these aspects and discuss their implications. Our
hypothesis is that if the way to make predictions –
i.e. to cope with uncertainty – changes, then the way
to insure also changes, with far-reaching consequences
on the decision-making processes of insurance compa-
nies and on society as a whole. The following sections
explore this hypothesis and its implications.
Discrimination and fairness
The principle of risk-pooling and risk-spreading on
which the rationality of modern insurance is based
has always oscillated between two opposing needs: on
the one hand, the aggregation of all cases for compen-
satory purposes; on the other hand, the segmentation
of the pool of policyholders on the basis of certain
differences (such as gender or age) which enable more
homogeneous risk classes to be defined. Segmentation
offers two main advantages: on the one hand, fairer
premiums based on the characteristics of the members
of a segment (if females statistically drive more careful-
ly than males, it is fair that they pay a lower insurance
premium). On the other hand, the insurance company
can be competitive by offering attractive policies on the
private insurance market.
The problem, however, lies in the fact that segmen-
tation is discriminatory by definition, because it is
based on the use of differences that impact significantly
on the price of coverage. The young male who drives
safely can feel that he is being discriminated against,
because his policy premium is calculated on the basis of
gender and age and not on his actual driving behav-
iour. Social fairness does not necessarily coincide with
individual fairness. These two concepts of ‘fairness’
clash and the conflict is exacerbated, rather than
resolved, when the insurance company can rely on
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behavioural data (Barry, 2019; Frezal and Barry, 2019;
Meyers and Van Hoyweghen, 2017).
Algorithmic prediction could radicalise the principle
of segmentation, culminating in the extreme case of
‘segments of one’. This would almost automatically
mean the end of the risk-pooling on which the principle
of risk-spreading is based (Albrecht, 2017a: 157ff,
2017b: 189ff; Charpentier et al., 2015: 57ff; Hay,
2015: 26ff; Houlle, 2015: 28ff). The consequences
would be felt at two levels: in the attitude of individuals
with respect to the insurance policy, and in the corpo-
rate policy of insurance companies. Here, we present
some preliminary reflections on these two points.
1. On the individual level, the policyholder can be
expected to refuse to share the uncertainty of her
peers and to demand to pay only for her own uncer-
tainty, leading to a demutualisation of risks that
would undermine the solidarity aspect of insurance
and produce a ‘discrimination without intent’
(Charpentier et al., 2015; Keller et al., 2018). The
result would be that the individuals most at risk,
and therefore most in need of insurance coverage,
would have to do without insurance because it
would only be available at unaffordable premiums,9
while individuals at less risk would pay negligible
premiums, as they would not need much insurance.
The effects could be paradoxical: those who knew
they were running few risks and could be covered with
little expense could pay for the insurance and then
change their behaviour, for example by becoming
more reckless when running a risk were more desirable
or profitable than not embarking in it. When an indi-
vidual knows that her behaviour is subject to forecast-
ing (and even knows what consequences that advance
information will have), she may be motivated to change
her behaviour (Luhmann, 1980: 1069). But how could
the insurer hide the result of prediction? In the case of
insurance policies, the premium already works as a
signal of prediction (Siegelman, 2014). It is therefore
difficult to hide the result of individualised forecasting,
unless the insurance company decides to adjust the pre-
miums to the rates traditionally calculated on the basis
of actuarial systems (in which case, however, the use of
predictive algorithms would become superfluous).
If, on the other hand, the insurance company deci-
ded to communicate its individual prediction, the pol-
icyholder would have several options:
• to pay for coverage if the prices were very low and
then not behave as predicted: as we said, this would
force the company to admit that it had promoted
adverse selection and moral hazard when its pur-
pose, on the contrary, was to reduce them;
• to do without insurance if the forecasts were very
favourable, but run the risk of being left without
coverage if the claim events were to take place, con-
trary to the forecast;
• to do without insurance because the premium was
too high.
In all of these cases, the disadvantages also affect the
insurance company and the profitability of its business
model.
2. From the insurance companies’ viewpoint, the dilem-
ma of future insurance could be to decide whether to
offer a fair price on the basis of highly individualised
predictions, but to the detriment of solidarity among
policyholders, or to guarantee that solidarity, but at
the expense of fair insurance premiums. In the opin-
ion of many observers, ‘there is no easy solution to
this dilemma’ (Keller et al., 2018: 12; cf. also Lasry,
2015: 22). On the other hand, if the mechanisms of
risk-pooling and risk-spreading were to disappear,
the fundamental pillar of what Franc¸ois Ewald
(1989) called ‘society of insurance’ would collapse,
with consequences that would affect the structures
of society as a whole.
If in the future insurance data-driven predictions
were to affect not only the reward system but also pric-
ing, it could be awkward for insurance companies to
justify decisions made not primarily on the basis of
causal relationships (as in statistical data processing),
but only on the basis of correlations (as in algorithmic
data processing). The problem is made harder by the
use of proxy data that work very well as predictors. For
example, credit reliability (even when you simply pay
bills on time) is an excellent predictor of careful driving
(Brockett and Golden, 2007). The result can be surpris-
ing. The colour orange, for example, is an excellent
predictor for good quality second-hand vehicles on
the car market, probably due to the fact that those
who choose such an unusual colour regard their car
as a form of expression of their identity (Hardy, 2012).
Digital technologies enable the search for predictors
to be multiplied by mining data, many of which are
proxy data. Decisions made on the basis of these cor-
relations, however, would be very difficult to justify,
especially when such decisions include or exclude
people in a highly selective manner. In the case of
insurance, companies would have to justify adverse
exclusion, i.e. the refusal of coverage for certain indi-
viduals due to characteristics that have no direct rela-
tionship with the object of coverage (Batty et al., 2010:
4, 13; Swedloff, 2014: 350ff, 366ff). On the other hand,
if these correlations worked very well as predictors,
how could insurance companies do without them?
4 Big Data & Society
This issue would probably end up being settled by the
law, on the basis of rules and with outcomes that are
not yet clear.10
Behavioural rates: Dilemmas of
usage-based insurance
The availability of big quantities of data and techni-
ques to process them also affects the relationship
between insurers and policyholders. One of the most
interesting novelties in current IoT is the so-called
‘behavioural rates’. These rates are based on the use
of self-tracking technologies, i.e. technical devices
which produce real-time data about individual behav-
iour (Boobier, 2016; Lupton, 2016; Ralph, 2017). Well-
known and increasingly common devices of this kind
are ‘wearable technologies’, such as smart watches, and
black boxes installed in vehicles.
Wearable technologies are discussed as tools for self-
tracking in order to incentivise a healthy lifestyle for
precautionary purposes. This type of coverage, called
pay-as-you-live (PAYL),11 however, is not actuarially
strongly developed and represents a very limited, pos-
sibly unrealistic business (cf. McFall, 2019). Therefore,
we focus our attention on the use of telematics data to
improve ratemaking in motor vehicle insurance
policies.
In the case of telemetry-based tracking devices, the
policyholder must install a black box in her car.12 This
black box produces data about speed, braking, corner-
ing, night-time driving and so on. Data is first translat-
ed into points. The policyholder also collects points
when she takes her vehicle in for an annual check-up
or completes a driving course. These points are then
used to calculate a score (usually represented by a
colour), which is communicated to the policyholder
every month. If the policyholder achieves a high
score, she receives some kind of reward, for example
a fuel cash-back or a premium discount when she
renews the car insurance policy. A low score is not
penalising, although the denial of a reward is already
in itself a kind of penalty. This kind of third-party lia-
bility car insurance coverage is called pay-as-you-drive
(PAYD) when the reward system is based on how long
you drive, and pay-how-you-drive (PHYD) when the
reward system is based on how you drive.13
The relationship between score and personalised
ratemaking is still under experimentation. First of all,
telematics data do not replace traditional statistical-
actuarial procedures (Picard, 2018: 96). Predictors
extrapolated from telematics data integrate traditional
statistical predictors, such as age and sex of the driver
or vehicle engine power, in view of the possibility of
finding strong correlations between past and future
(Baecke and Bocca, 2017; Guillen et al., 2019a;
Wu¨thrich, 2017). Unlike traditional statistical factors,
signals based on telematics data are obtained directly
from the behaviour of the insured, while classic statis-
tical data only offers proxy variables with respect to the
prediction of future events (Ayuso et al., 2016; Baecke
and Bocca, 2017; Denuit et al., 2019; Gao et al., 2019;
Guillen et al., 2019a; Ma et al., 2018). Taking this dif-
ference into account, some research (Verbelen, 2018:
esp. 1300ff; Wu¨thrich, 2017: 1ff) has hypothesised
that telematic predictors not only work better but
could even replace statistical variables in the near
future offering, among other things, an effective strat-
egy to circumvent the European legislation which pro-
hibits the use of gender as variable in the pricing of
motor insurance policies as a discriminatory practice.
These risks of unfair use of algorithmic procedures
must be carefully monitored.
Already at this stage, however, behavioural rates in
motor insurance policies offer an opportunity to shed
light on the ongoing transformations in the insurance
business model. At first sight, these are very similar to
traditional ‘no-claims bonus’ reward systems (if you
drive safely and do not report any claim, you receive
a premium discount upon renewal of your insurance
policy). Yet there is a difference. The no-claims
bonus system is based on accidents. Consequently, the
basic difference that drives ratemaking is ‘it happens/it
doesn’t happen’. The PAYD reward system, instead, is
based on behaviour. The basic difference is ‘safe/
unsafe’. From a temporal viewpoint, in the former
case a reward is offered after the end of the insurance
period, while in the latter case a reward is offered
during the whole period of insurance coverage.
In our opinion, these differences have far-reaching
effects on insurance mechanisms. The production of a
score starting from data generated by the policyhold-
er’s behaviour and the need to base the reward system
on the score achieved, together affect the relationship
between the insurer and the policyholder first of all in
terms of communication. We focus here on four
consequences.
1. The use of digital technologies and Big Data processing
might reverse the information asymmetry which has
always been a crucial problem for the insurance indus-
try. ‘Information asymmetry’ notoriously refers to
the situation in which insured persons have informa-
tion about themselves and their own risk conditions
that they do not disclose to the insurers.14 Since the
company is incapable of accessing information that is
known only to the policyholder, it runs the risk of
selecting individuals who are more exposed to
danger (adverse selection), thereby increasing its
burden in terms of claim losses (Zweifel and Eisen,
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2003: 320ff). Information asymmetry is, moreover,
the underlying cause of moral hazard (Arrow, 1971a:
202ff, 1971b: 142; Heimer, 1985; Stiglitz, 1983: 6). A
person who knows that she is covered by insurance is
more inclined to run risks, affecting the probability of
claims and the amount of overall losses to be borne by
the company.
This asymmetry could be reversed with digital tech-
nologies (Lasry, 2015: 23; Siegelman, 2014: 317ff). The
availability of large amounts of data and the ability to
process them algorithmically could enable insurance
companies to know much more about the policyholder
than the policyholder knows about himself. The possi-
bility for the company to be informed about the policy-
holder’s behaviour throughout the whole period of
insurance coverage could lead to a condition in which
the problem of moral hazard could be, if not resolved,
at least ‘technically controlled’ (Van Hoyweghen et al.,
2006: 1231). In this hypothetical scenario, wearable
technologies and telemetry-based technical devices
would reduce or even remove the problem of imperfect
information about the policyholder’s behaviour
(Stiglitz, 1983: 5), and the business of insurance
would benefit from it (for example, by improving the
detection of fraud).
On the other hand, however, the availability of vir-
tually perfect information about customers’ behaviour
could lead to a condition in which the very possibility
of insurance would be eliminated. If the forecasts were
so precise as to eliminate uncertainty, there would be
no interest in buying or selling a policy that exactly
matches the level of risk: individuals would instead be
expected to turn to financial instruments to organise
their private security. Moreover, customers would be
inclined to monitor the offers made by insurance com-
panies as a way of obtaining information about their
risk profile, potentially starting a feedback loop in pre-
dictive procedures, with unpredictable and maybe par-
adoxical outcomes.
2. If personalised policies became so common as to be
normal, privacy would become a luxury good that only
wealthy people could afford (O’Neil, 2016: 170). The
policyholder may decide not to provide the insur-
ance company with data by refusing to install a
black box in her vehicle. In this way, however, she
voluntarily opts out of the reward system and risks
paying more than those who consent to installing a
black box – and must be able to afford it.15 The
underlying reasoning would be ‘if you want privacy,
you have to pay for it’.
But the alternative of providing insurance with
behavioural data is not without flaws and
complications. Continuous monitoring of personal
behaviour can be perceived in the long run as an inter-
ference with the right of self-determination (Keller
et al., 2018: 12; Steiner, 2018: 75). The close depen-
dence established between reward/punishment and
individual behaviour means, in fact, that precautionary
reasoning (exercising to avoid common chronic dis-
eases, driving safely to avoid accidents) transforms
the ‘proactive’ logic into a veritable ‘aggressive’ logic
(Kerr and Earle, 2013: 69).16
3. Behavioural rates would change the reciprocal claims
and expectations of both insurance companies and pol-
icyholders, raising an issue of transparency. What
would happen, for example, if the policyholder
stated that she did not report any claim because
she drove safely, while the insurance company
stated that she drove unsafely although she did not
report any claim? Because discrimination would no
longer be based on the occurrence (or non-
occurrence) of an accident but on behaviour, the
insurance company should at least justify how it
could determine what is safe and what is unsafe
when it processes data by means of algorithms
(Scism and Maremont, 2010).
Actuarial mathematicians themselves are aware of
the complexity of the data processing that allows
them to find reliable signals that are strongly correlated
to future claims. Assuming, for example, that risk
exposure is directly proportional to the number of
miles travelled by car (as is the case with PAYD poli-
cies) is questionable because as the number of miles
driven increases, so does the driver’s experience (the
so-called ‘learning effect’), with the result that the
number of accidents decreases while the number of
good drivers increases in relation to the frequencies
expected if the ratios were directly proportional
(Guillen et al., 2019a). At the same time, some actuarial
mathematicians suggest to consider also the correlation
of telematics data with so-called ‘near-miss’ events, i.e.,
narrowly avoided accidents, as the latter would be
strictly correlated with the risk of being involved in
future car accidents (Guillen et al., 2019b). The under-
lying reasoning would be that those who often come
very close to having an accident should be treated as
those who already claimed, although there has not (yet)
been any accident.
4. The combination of a telemetry-based definition of
safety and behavioural rates can lead to paradoxical
effects. Consider a mother who drives to pick up her
son from the nightclub and bring him home, travel-
ling by car at night on busy roads where accidents
often occur due to the abuse of alcohol and drugs. A
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PHYD policy would penalise this behaviour, con-
sidering it unsafe.17 The paradox is that this care-
lessness would be the result of a careful behaviour
that is difficult to dispute. Even if the individual
driving behaviours were motivated, there would be
no solution to the conflict between the carefulness
perceived by the mother and the carelessness calcu-
lated by the algorithm. For insurance companies, it
would be difficult to motivate this interference in the
family’s daily life by deciding what its members may
(or may not) do. Some people, such as bakers,
would be penalised both in the case they installed
a black box (which would detect an excess of night-
driving behaviour), and in the case they did not
agree to do it (because they would lose the
opportunity to take advantage of rewards). This
‘in-both-cases’ penalty would rightly be rejected as
an unfairly discriminating assessment.
Overall, the analysis of possible consequences of
personalisation in insurance practices gives rise to a
reflection about the function of insurance. The underly-
ing reasoning of PAYD and PHYD rates could be for-
mulated as follows: ‘If you want to pay less, reduce
your exposure to danger’. This reasoning, however,
may be in contradiction with the meaning of insurance.
From the very beginning, the function of insurance
has never been to remove the possibility of damage – in
this respect, various forms of precaution are more
useful, such as wearing a helmet when you ride a
motorcycle or checking the conditions of river banks
to avoid flooding. Instead, insurance invites those who
embark on some enterprise to envisage alternative pos-
sibilities in case the final outcome should be ruinous
(Cevolini, 2019; Esposito, 2009). The argument goes:
Even if things may go wrong and I am aware of it, I
will be covered by my insurance, and this encourages
me to act. A future damage, thus, is not simply an
obstacle but becomes the starting point to consider
possible courses of events which include, rather than
exclude, worst case. In this respect, as Ewald (1991:
208) points out, insurance works as a liberator of
action.
The question now is whether individualised predic-
tion risks turning insurance into an inhibitor of action,
since the effect of a behaviour-based tariff could be to
discourage policyholders from embarking on actions
which somehow expose them to danger. This contrasts
strikingly with the social function of insurance. In addi-
tion to the usual advice to ‘limit hard braking’ and
‘avoid late night driving’, for example, the common
American PHYD car insurance policy Snapshot18 sug-
gests that policyholders should ‘drive less overall’!
This possible inhibition resonates with the wide-
spread concern that predictions can have the
preemptive effect of ‘diminishing a person’s range of
future options’ (Kerr and Earle, 2013: 67). Typical
cases are no-fly lists or judges’ decision not to parole
inmates. In such cases, what is limited (and eventually
removed) is not only the possibility of damage, but also
the possibility of action on the part of all those
involved. Similarly, if the proactive effect of personal-
ised insurance was to affect the behaviour of individu-
als in order virtually to remove the possibility of
damage, a number of risky behaviours would be elim-
inated at the outset, along with the related opportuni-
ties. Truly innovative entrepreneurial initiatives or
alternative lifestyles would risk becoming untenable
from an insurance viewpoint, or they could only be
undertaken without any coverage against possible
damage, which would discourage many from embark-
ing on them. Proactive insurance, in other words,
would have the effect of contracting, rather than
expanding, the space of imagination on which the inno-
vative potential of modern society largely depends.
Closing remarks
The development of algorithmic forecasting techniques
poses several challenges to the social function of insur-
ance. Intriguing opportunities are accompanied by
large areas of uncertainty and by new and still unex-
plored risk dimensions. Risk is unavoidable: even if
insurance companies give up using InsurTech or post-
pone the decision, this itself is a decision that could
have disastrous consequences on the company’s com-
petitiveness and on the possibility to offer effective cov-
erage.19 At the same time, InsurTech could mean the
end of the institution of insurance – at least as we have
known it over the last three centuries.
The other side of the enthusiasm for the possibility
of satisfying the insurance industry’s ‘voracious appe-
tite for data’ (Swedloff, 2014: 341) is a certain hesita-
tion when faced with a ‘fathomless future’. For the time
being, the only certainty is that the form of insurance
will be involved in the ongoing changes. Whether insur-
ance companies decide to do without digital technolo-
gies or to invest in them (as is already the case) and
gradually adapt their business model, they are called
upon to react, with wide-ranging effects on the social
way to manage the uncertainty of the future.
At the present stage, however, it is important to dis-
tinguish between two issues: what many analysts say
could be done with digital technologies, and what insur-
ance companies are already doing with digital technol-
ogies. The use of Big Data has produced a big narrative
about the predictive capability of the algorithms used
to process these data. According to some observers
(Siegelman, 2014: 325), this predictive power is ‘grossly
exaggerated’, because social regularities are much more
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irregular than the regularities of the natural world, and
the future remains unpredictable even when (or just
when) we do everything possible to predict it.
Moreover, predictive algorithms have not yet been
applied to what is perhaps the most sensitive and cru-
cial operation of the entire insurance mechanism: pric-
ing. As McFall and Moor (2018: 205) rightly observe, it
is premature, at least empirically, to come to the con-
clusion that premiums are tailored to individual policy-
holders in connected insurance.20 However, it is maybe
not premature to ask what could happen if such a tai-
loring of policy premiums would replace traditional
actuarial practices, when one bears in mind that, as
McFall (2019: 54) points out, price personalisation
would personalise access to goods and services (e.g.
care, credit, retirement benefits) as well.
In our opinion, the relationship between prediction,
price and personalisation with which the digital society
is confronted is the outcome of a more general socio-
evolutionary dynamic depending on the internalisation
of attributions which is characteristic of the risk society
(Beck, 2005; Luhmann, 1993). In the case of insurance,
the basic problem is always how to avoid adverse selec-
tion, i.e. the choice of particularly risky clients that will
cost the company much more than the company has
earned from the insurance premium. What is new in
digital insurance is not so much that insurance compa-
nies try to predict risk in order to select the best cases in
advance, but rather that the prediction is calculated
directly on individual behaviour. External variables
such as gender, age, race or place of residence are
replaced, as we have seen, by internal, i.e. behavioural,
variables. And the insurance premium could be calcu-
lated accordingly. While some observers claim that this
would be justified for reasons of fairness (those who
take more risks should pay more), others fear that
the personalisation of prices could shape life-chances
and produce new forms of discrimination. Unlike the
traditional stratification into social classes, where dis-
crimination was an assumption that affected individual
life-chances, with the new alliance between actuarial
techniques and digital technologies, discrimination
would rather be a consequence of individual life-style,
and generate classification situations that would affect
individual life-chances in ways that are still largely
unpredictable (Fourcade and Healy, 2013: esp. 560ff;
cf. also Moor and Lury, 2018).
In any case, the possibility of replacing the assess-
ment of the average with the assessment of the policy-
holder profile introduces a new way to deal with the
uncertainty of the future. Empirical research is needed
to observe whether this alleged epistemological revolu-
tion (Ewald, 2012: 10, 23) generates a concomitant
pragmatic revolution – pragmatic both in the sense
that insurance rates are calculated on the basis of the
policyholder’s actual behaviour, and in the sense that
her behaviour is conditioned by the fact that she knows
that the price of the policy depends on that behaviour.
This in turn could have circular effects with far-
reaching consequences on social institutions, on the
forms of solidarity and on the relationship with the
future in the digital society.
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1. Strictly speaking, machine learning procedures only have
the purpose to extract patterns from data. These patterns
can be used to test systems and improve them starting
from mistakes. The approach of Predictive Analytics
claims to go further and to use these techniques to
make individual predictions.
2. For a critical discussion of Daston’s argument, see Clark
(1999); McFall (2007, 2011).
3. McFall and Moor (2018: 197) speak of ‘outsider technol-
ogies’, i.e. technologies that ‘were not developed with
insurance in mind’.
4. The acronym ‘IoT’ for Insurance of Things is commonly
used in the literature in the field, intentionally playing
with the ambiguity with the Internet of Things: Cf.
Boobier (2016: esp. 15). See also https://www.the-digi
tal-insurer.com/blog/insurtech-insurance-of-things-how-
iot-shows-prevention-is-better-than-cure-for-insurers/
(last retrieval 18 February 2020).
5. The issue of personalising policy premiums is controver-
sial, first of all empirically. We come back to this point in
the conclusions.
8 Big Data & Society
6. ‘Insurance is the paradigmatic risk-spreading institution’
(Baker and Simon, 2002: 7). This principle actually
precedes the modern form of insurance. Already in the
mid-15th century, Benedetto Cotrugli ([1458] 1602: 75)
suggested it would be wise ‘to insure continuously every
ship, because one supports the other, and in many [cases
the insurer] can only gain’ (‘assicurare al continuo, &
sopra ogni nave, perche l’una ristora l’altra, & di molti
[casi l’assicuratore] non puo` che guadagnare’).
7. What Pascal (1954, n. 451: 250) said about the gambler
also applies to insurance: he ‘ventures with certainty to
gain with uncertainty’ (‘hasarde avec certitude pour
gagner avec incertitude’).
8. According to D’Amador (1837: 32), ‘probability is, some-
how, only the surrogate for certainty’ (‘la probabilite
n’est en quelque sorte que le substitut de la certitude’).
9. This scenario would be particularly problematic in cases
in which insurance is mandatory and people cannot opt
to bear their own risk.
10. In the case of genetic information, many countries world-
wide have adopted regulations restricting access for
insurance companies in recent decades (Blasimme et al.,
2019). Such restrictions, however, mostly do not cover
the use of Big Data in general, as for example informa-
tion obtained in precision medicine studies.
11. Cf. Arentz and Rehm (2016), Ernst and Young (2015)
and Frary (2019) focus on the German case. A frequent
PAYL is the Vitality Health policy offered by the South-
African insurance company Discovery.
12. Or a phone app: see Van Hoyweghen and Meyers in this
special issue.
13. A good example is the Vitality Drive policy also offered
by the South-African insurance company Discovery. See
also the Fairzekering policy extensively described by
Meyers and Van Hoyweghen (2017). Some insurance
companies, such as Ingenie or Insurethebox, offer
PHYD policies for newly licensed young people who
are guaranteed a significant discount upon renewal of
their policy if they drove prudently in the first year.
The score, from 0 to 100 points, is communicated every
10 days and is divided into the colours green, light green,
amber, orange, red and black. Cf. Stott (2016).
14. In his Discours preliminaire (preliminary discourse) to
Pothier’s well-known Traite du contrat d’assurance
(Treatise on the Law of Insurance), Jean-Julien
Estrangin (1810: xiv) pointed out that the insurer is
forced to bargain ‘so to speak, blindly with the policy-
holder, who alone has the secret of his business and the
intimate knowledge of facts concerning the insurance.’
15. A partly similar issue is discussed by Blasimme et al.
(2019) with reference to people’s propensity to enrol in
health-related studies and, specifically, in precision med-
icine research. Fearing that insurance companies may
have access to their biomedical Big Data and that they
may be denied insurance coverage, some people may
become reluctant to participate – thereby also losing
the advantage of receiving relevant findings about their
health.
16. Moor and Lury (2018) speak of a ‘dynamic disciplining
function’ in price personalisation.
17. Of course, driving at night is not the only parameter used
in PHYD policies. However, a number of actuarial stu-
dies shows that night-driving is one of the most crucial
signals, along with distance driven above the speed limit
and distance travelled in urban zones, correlated with
future claims (see Baecke and Bocca, 2017; Denuit
et al., 2019: 386ff; Verbelen, 2018).
18. Snapshot is offered by Progressive. The motto is ‘Drive
safe and save. Drive extra safe and save even more.’ See
https://www.progressive.com/auto/discounts/snapshot/
(last retrieval 7 May 2019).
19. According to Thourot and Folly (2016: 201), ‘the disdain
[of the Big Data revolution] is a threat’ for the insurance
industry.
20. See also McFall (2019) on the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act 2010 (ACA), widely known as
‘Obamacare’.
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